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Abstract
This paper studies how insurance from progressive taxation improves the
matching of workers to occupations. We propose an equilibrium dynamic as-
signment model to illustrate how social insurance encourages mobility. Work-
ers experiment to find their best occupational fit in a process filled with uncer-
tainty. Risk aversion and limited earnings insurance induce workers to remain
in unfitting occupations. We estimate the model using microdata from the
United States and Germany. Higher earnings uncertainty explains the U.S.
higher mobility rate. When workers in the United States enjoy Germany’s
higher progressivity, mobility rises. Output and welfare gains are large.
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1 Introduction
Can redistributive taxation increase aggregate output by encouraging occupational
mobility? According to conventional wisdom the answer is no. Continental Eu-
rope, with its high levels of redistribution and low job and occupational mobility
rates, is presented as a case in point. In this paper, we argue instead that redistribu-
tive taxation encourages occupational mobility. The better assignment of workers
to occupations that follows results in higher productivity and output. To arrive
at that answer, we link two seemingly unrelated areas of work. One highlights
the role of job and occupational mobility in producing better matches, and as a
result, higher productivity and earnings.1 The other, studies the welfare effects
of social insurance policies, particularly, progressive taxation. These policies are
designed to shield workers from adverse earnings shocks and reduce inequality. It
is the insurance provided to risk averse workers by the tax system that leads to a
higher occupational mobility rate when redistribution rises. We also demonstrate
that the source of the low occupational mobility rate in Germany—representative
of Continental Europe —is the much lower frequency of large shocks to earnings
experienced by German workers.
The central argument of this paper is as follows. The process of finding the best
occupation requires experimentation by workers. Few ever have perfect informa-
tion about their abilities and, as a result, about the likelihood of success in every
available occupation. To overcome this obstacle they try alternative professions,
settling for one when the gain in a prospective occupation is not worth the risk.2
Even when workers know their abilities, they may change occupations in response
to shifts in earnings prospects in alternative occupations, a common aspect of la-
bor markets.3 If opportunities to insure earnings risk are limited and workers are
risk-averse, they may settle for an unfit occupation, forgoing opportunities that the
labor market offers. Therefore, lack of insurance is a source of worker misalloca-
tion. By partially filling in for missing private insurance markets, social insurance
1Early references for this line of work are Jovanovic (1979), Miller (1984), and Topel and Ward
(1992).
2These ideas are central to Miller (1984) and countless references after his work.
3Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) emphasize the role of occupation-specific shocks to earnings.
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programs— for example, progressive or redistributive taxation—favor risk-taking
and encourage mobility.4 As a result, such programs improve the sorting of work-
ers into occupations, thus raising output and welfare.
The mechanism we highlight has not been explored, let alone quantified, in a
vast literature on macroeconomics and public finance in which the central question
is the design of tax and transfer schemes. We fill this gap by linking the two ar-
eas of the literature described earlier. In doing so, we make empirical, theoretical,
and quantitative contributions. On the empirical side we uncover new features of
the U.S. and German labor markets. On the theoretical side we build an equilib-
rium ability-to-occupation assignment model (Roy, 1951) with missing insurance
markets. Our framework allows analysis of the interaction of occupational choice,
earnings risk, and social insurance.5 On the quantitative side, we take our the-
oretical framework to the data and quantify the output and welfare of different
policies. Our analysis focuses on one type of social insurance policy: progressive
taxation.6
We begin by documenting new facts about earnings risk and occupational mo-
bility for the United States and Germany. We focus our analysis on these two coun-
tries because of the substantial differences in their tax systems (see Holter, Krueger,
and Stepanchuk, 2015). The German tax system is more progressive than that of the
United States.7 We find that, first, the U.S. labor market is much riskier—earnings
are more uncertain—than the German labor market. We estimate the standard de-
viation of permanent shocks to earnings in both countries and find that on average
it is 40% higher in the United States.8 Second, there is substantial variation in earn-
ings risk across occupations in both countries. In the Unite States, sales workers
4The idea that redistributive taxation makes uncertainty more attractive for risk-averse individ-
uals goes back to Mirrlees (1974), Eaton and Rosen (1980a), Eaton and Rosen (1980b), and Varian
(1980).
5Throughout the paper the terms “risk” and “uncertainty” are used interchangeably.
6We do not consider the intensive margin of the labor supply as well as savings, and thus
we abstract from some of the negative effect of progressivity. Our goal is to quantify how much
progressivity improves the matching of workers to occupations. We show that the effects on output
and welfare are large.
7A second reason is that we have comparable longitudinal microdata available.
8Note that these are permanent shocks, so even small differences in the standard deviation of
earnings can translate into large changes in utility.
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experience large permanent shocks to earnings, whereas administrative workers
do not. In Germany, the riskiest occupation is being a manager and the safest is
being a clerical worker.9 Third, occupational mobility—the rate at which workers
change occupations—is substantially lower in Germany. The 2-year mobility rate
in the United States is about 25%, but it is only 3.7% in Germany. At face value,
this fact may seem to invalidate our hypothesis: that Germany’s more generous
social insurance programs encourage mobility. Yet, it is possible that differences in
risk across the two economies partly explain the disparity in occupational mobil-
ity.10 To isolate the importance of earnings risk for occupational mobility, we use
a logit model to estimate the likelihood of a worker switching occupations when
faced with an unpredictable drop in earnings. That likelihood, which we label the
propensity to switch, is similar for German and U.S. workers. This finding suggests
that U.S. workers change occupations more frequently as a natural response to the
larger shocks they face compared with German workers.
Our theoretical contribution is to develop a life-cycle model incorporating the
interaction among earnings risk, social insurance, and occupational mobility. Ev-
ery period, a worker’s decision is to pick between two options: remaining in the
current occupation or switching to a more uncertain alternative. A worker’s hu-
man capital comes in two varieties. The first variety is an occupation-specific innate
ability that is discovered sequentially. The second variety is a general— transfer-
able across occupations—level of human capital. As workers’ careers progress,
more information is revealed about their innate abilities; experience reduces labor
market uncertainty. However, workers experience occupation-specific permanent
shocks to their general human capital. For workers, a prospective occupation is
always more uncertain than their current occupation. The insurance provided by
progressive taxes increases the relative value of uncertainty. The reason is that
9The standard deviations of permanent shocks, exogenous in our analysis, reflect many differ-
ences in the labor markets in these countries. For example, regulations and institutions such as
collective bargaining make hours and wage adjustments less frequent in Germany compared with
the United States (e.g. the retail sector for sales workers is much more regulated in Germany).
10There are other aspects of these countries that surely affect the mobility of workers. An example
is the vocational educational system in Germany. Our model does not incorporate many of the
institutional differences. We opt instead to have an age-dependent mobility cost function whose
role in the model is to capture these institutional differences.
4
workers dislike risk, and progressive taxes redistribute from high to low earnings
realizations. As a result, under a more progressive tax, a worker sees a lower prob-
ability of a low-earnings outcome. Of course, he also sees a lower probability of
a high outcome, but that is the purpose of insurance. Because he is risk-averse,
the worker accepts the trade-off: the lower likelihood of low earnings more than
compensates, in utility terms, the lower likelihood of high earnings. This effect is
larger the riskier an occupation is. In other words, the increase in the relative value
of a risky occupation is greater than that of a safe occupation. Risky occupations
become relatively more attractive.
In the model, labor markets—one for each occupation—are competitive. The
price of a unit of efficiency clears the market for a given occupation. The demand
for that occupation is driven by a technology employing all occupations and used
to produce a general consumption good. The supply is driven by the selection
of workers into that occupation based on their individual job histories. Despite
the higher relative value of risky occupations, it is not inevitable that the size of
risky occupations increases after a more progressive tax is introduced. The result
is a combination of two effects. First, a more progressive tax function increases
the number of inflows to riskier occupations. But because those occupations are
risky—earnings shocks are large—the number of outflows also increases. Second,
as workers flow into risky occupations, the equilibrium price of an efficiency unit
falls, making that occupation relatively less attractive.
We calibrate the model to the United States and Germany using our estimates
of permanent earnings risk as well as data on occupational mobility. We then ask,
how much does social insurance matter for output and welfare? To answer that
question, we assign the more progressive German tax system to the United States
and find that occupation mobility increases as workers are willing to assume more
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risk.11The higher rate of mobility increases output by 4%.12 To understand our
results, note that the decision of switching occupations rule always takes the form
of a productivity cutoff below which the worker stays in the current occupation.
Productivity is the result of abilities and general human capital, so realizations
of the first or shocks to the second (or both) may prompt a switch. By making
switches more attractive, progressivity raises the productivity cutoff. As a result, a
marginal worker—who is indifferent between switching or staying—is more pro-
ductive. Productivity per worker rises and so does aggregate output. To inves-
tigate the welfare effects of such a policy change, we compute the consumption
equivalent variation (CEV). Welfare rises by 2.6% of annual consumption. Both the
higher output and the smoother earnings—consequences of the extra insurance—
underlie the rise in welfare.13 The calibrated model also allows us to isolate the
effect of the extra insurance on workers’ mobility decisions. To that end, we cal-
culate workers’ propensity to switch occupations using simulated data from the
baseline and the counterfactual economies. The propensity to switch increases by
18% when U.S. workers enjoy the insurance of the German tax system.
As in the empirical section, we examine whether the more volatile U.S. labor
market is responsible for a higher occupational mobility rate.14 For that purpose,
we force U.S. workers to face the earnings risk of Germany. Mobility drops by 13
percentage points, and because the potential for high outcomes is lower, aggregate
11The tax functions for the U.S. and Germany that we employ are estimated in Holter, Krueger,
and Stepanchuk (2015). This class of tax functions to summarize the income tax code were first
proposed by Berliant and Gouveia (1993) and have been extensively used in the literature (see
Conesa and Krueger (2006), Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2014) and Guner, Kaygusuz,
and Ventura (2014)). Although, one can consider a richer social insurance policy, this approach is
appealing because: (i) it is tractable, (ii) it approximates closely and in a parsimonious way the
income tax code, and (iii) the functional forms are flexible enough to incorporate a wide variety of
transfer schemes.
12In this counterfactual we ensure that the average level of earnings taxes — measured by the
ratio of tax revenues to output — remains the same. In other words, the effects we find are only
due to higher progressivity and not to changes in the average level of taxes, which differ between
Germany and the United States.
13In the same way, we perform the counterfactual exercise in which we give Germany the less
progressive tax system of the United States. As expected, occupational mobility, output, and wel-
fare, fall.
14That more risk leads to higher mobility appears to contradict our main message, which is that
social insurance - which lowers earnings volatility - increases mobility. Note, however, that when
one modifies the degree of tax progressivity, the underlying distribution of shocks remains the
same. We further discuss this issue below, once we have presented our model results.
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output drops as well: by 39%. Despite this drop in output, U.S. workers would
rather live in this low-risk economy than in the benchmark. The benefits from the
smoother earnings more than offset the losses from the lower mean earnings.
Related Literature: The paper connects four strands of the literature in macroe-
conomics and public finance. First, it relates to works studying the welfare effects
of the social insurance from progressive income taxation. Our work is particularly
related to the studies of Benabou (2002), Conesa and Krueger (2006), Conesa, Kitao,
and Krueger (2009), and Seshadri and Yuki (2004). Following the work of Mirrlees
(1974), Eaton and Rosen (1980a), Eaton and Rosen (1980b), and Varian (1980), those
authors incorporate the effect of the insurance provided by progressive taxation
into models with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. Along the same line, Acemoglu
and Shimer (1999) and Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) study the positive effect of
unemployment insurance policies on the willingness of unemployed workers to
accept low-productivity job offers. Another example is Golosov, Kocherlakota,
and Tsyvinski (2003), who also incorporate idiosyncratic income shocks and pri-
vate information to study the optimality of capital taxation. Since we study the
assignment of heterogeneous workers to occupations, our work is also related to
studies of optimal taxation using task-to-talent assignment models. Examples are
Rothschild and Scheuer (2013) and Ales, Kurnaz, and Sleet (2015) who study opti-
mal taxation in static models when the talent of individuals is private information.
Our paper distinguishes itself in many dimensions. First, our focus is not nor-
mative. Rather, we take a more quantitative approach to measure the importance
of earnings risk and social insurance in the career choices of individuals. As op-
posed to some of the assignment models discussed earlier (e.g. Ales, Kurnaz, and
Sleet, 2015), our framework incorporates the dynamic nature of career progres-
sions. There are important questions in public economics and macroeconomics
that are inherently dynamic. For example, workers’ skills change stochastically
and have a life-cycle component. Another example is that shocks may not only
affect earnings within the same occupation but also trigger occupational changes.
Our paper documents patterns of occupational mobility and analyze them in
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the context of an aggregate environment. We incorporate both new facts by com-
paring Germany and the United States and a new mechanism through which occu-
pational mobility increases endogenously due to the earnings risk faced by work-
ers. For these reasons, we see our work as complementing the work of Kambourov
and Manovskii (2008, 2009). In addition, we incorporate the mechanisms present
in Jovanovic (1979), Miller (1984), and Papageorgiou (2014). We complement their
findings as well as the ones present in Cubas and Silos (2017), Silos and Smith
(2015), Hawkins and Mustre del Rio (2012), Dillon (2017), and Neumuller (2015)
by linking risk and abilities to the experimentation process. More importantly,
by analyzing insurance policies in the context of a model of occupational choice
with incomplete markets, we connect that literature to the work on public finance
reviewed earlier.
Finally, our paper has implications for earnings inequality. Thus, it connects to
other studies in macroeconomics concerned with the sources of lifetime inequality.
Important such works are those by Keane and Wolpin (1997); Huggett, Ventura,
and Yaron (2011); and Lee and Seshadri (2016). Although the human capital ac-
cumulation process is not as rich as in those papers, we incorporate the career
choices of workers, which can be seen as part of their human capital accumula-
tion process. In addition, in our framework the lack of missing private insurance
markets greatly affects aggregate output and income inequality. For these reasons,
our paper complements the findings of Benabou (2002), and Lee and Seshadri
(2017). In our case, we find that most of the lifetime inequality is explained by the
shocks to the general human capital that occur during a worker’s career (80% in
the United States and 70% in Germany). The remainder is due to differences in
occupation-specific abilities (ex ante heterogeneity).
2 Facts
This paper studies how the interaction between earnings uncertainty and insur-
ance opportunities determines workers’ occupational choices. We begin by docu-
menting new facts on occupational earnings risk and mobility for Germany and
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the United States. The reason for our focus on these two economies is twofold.
First, they are the two largest economies for which high-quality harmonized panel
data on earnings and occupations are available, for roughly the same time period.
Second, even though they are both advanced economies, likely at the technological
frontier, they provide quite different levels of social insurance.
2.1 Data
We use comparable cross-country longitudinal household surveys provided by the
Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF) at Ohio State University. The file contains
consistently defined variables for a set of developed countries. Included in that
data set are the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics In 1968 the PSID started collecting in-
formation on a sample of roughly 5,000 households. Of these, about 3,000 were
representative of the U.S. population (the core sample) and about 2,000 were low-
income families (the Census Bureau’s Survey of Economic Opportunity [SEO] sam-
ple). Thereafter, both the original families and their descendants (children of the
original family forming a family of their own) have been followed. The panel is
annual until 1997; it has since become biennial. In the empirical analysis we use
the entire sample from 1980 through 2007 and adapt the estimation methodology
to the change in the sampling frequency.15
The Socio-Economic Panel The SOEP data are drawn from the SOEP-CNEF files.
The SOEP is a wide-ranging representative longitudinal study of private house-
holds, located at the German Institute for Economic Research, DIW Berlin. Every
year nearly 15,000 households, and about 25,000 persons are sampled. The data
provide information on all household members, consisting of Germans living in
the old and new German states, foreigners, and recent immigrants to Germany.
The panel started in 1984 and we use data up to 2012.
15The reason to start in 1980 is to have a approximately comparable sample period for Germany
and the United States.
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For both countries, we restrict our sample to working-age individuals 26 to 60
years of age. We omit those who are not employed or who are self-employed,
those who do not report earnings, education, or hours worked; as well as individ-
uals with fewer than 8 years of consecutive data. In the PSID-CNEF, individuals
are classified into occupations according to ISCO-68 and industries according to
a 34-industry classification provided by the CNEF.16. The SOEP occupations are
provided by using the ISCO-2008 (an update of ISCO-68) classification, so we con-
vert them to the ISCO-68 by following the cross-walk provided by the ILO. After
grouping the data into 12 occupations (see the appendix) the resulting data set is a
panel of individuals’ labor earnings per hour, employment status, age, education
level, industry, occupation, and gender.
2.2 Labor Income Shocks
We use a regression approach extensively used in the literature (see, for instance,
Carroll and Samwick, 1997) to compute earnings variability at the individual level.
We estimate a fixed effects model for each occupation j in our sample. Given a
panel of N individuals for whom we measure earnings per hour worked (and
other variables) over a period of time T, we assume that (log) earnings per hour
for individual i in occupation j at time t, yijt, can be written as:
yijt = αij + βjX ijt + uijt. (1)
The vector X includes observables that predict changes in the level of log earn-
ings: age, gender, ethnicity, years of schooling, an industry dummy, and time
dummies. β j are the corresponding coefficients, αij is the individual fixed effect,
and uijt the residual. We estimate equation (1) for all individuals in a given occu-
pation. Repeating this procedure for all occupations yields estimates {αˆij, βˆj}12j=1.
The nature of risk faced by workers is important for assessing the welfare con-
sequences of changing social policies. Temporary shocks should not lead to major
changes in workers’ careers and are easily overcome by a small amount of savings.
16ISCO-68 refers to the first International Standard Classification of Occupations issued by the
International Labor Organization (ILO).
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For that reason, we focus only on permanent (or very persistent) risk that can be
associated with, for instance, a depreciation of occupation-specific human capital
and can therefore lead to an occupational change. To decompose risk into a per-
manent component and a transitory component, we follow Carroll and Samwick
(1997) and Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010), among others. We assume that
uijt = ηijt +ωijt, (2)
where ηijt, the transitory component, is distributed i.i.d. N(0, σ2η j) and ωijt, the
permanent component, follow a random walk,
ωijt = ωij,t−1 + eijt, (3)
with i.i.d. innovations eijt that are distributed N(0, σ2ej). By estimating equation
(1), we obtain {{uˆijt}Nji=1}Tt=1.
Our procedure to estimate the variances of e and η follows Low, Meghir, and
Pistaferri (2010). Given that the PSID is biennial after 1997, we take second differ-
ences in equation (10). Using (2), we have
∆2yijt = yijt − yijt−2 = βjX ijt + ηijt +ωijt − βjX ijt−2 + ηijt−2 +ωijt−2. (4)
Now define
gijt = ∆(yijt − βjX ijt) = ∆ηijt + eijt, (5)
and
g2ijt = ∆2(yijt − βjX ijt) = ηijt +ωijt − ηijt−2 −ωijt−2 = ηijt − ηijt−2 + eijt + eijt−1.
(6)
To identify the parameters of interest, we compute
E(g2ijtg2ijt) = 2σ
2
eij
+ 2σ2ηij (7)
and
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E(gijtgijt−1) = −σ2ηij . (8)
To estimate the variances of the two innovations, we proceed as follows. For a
sample of workers in a given occupation j, we estimate ̂E(g2ijtg2ijt) and ̂E(gijtgijt−1)
using the sample analogs. Solving the system composed of the previous two equa-
tions, we obtain σ̂2ej and σ̂
2
ηj
.
2.2.1 Results
Table 1 shows the estimated variance of the permanent shocks to labor earnings by
occupation and country. There are substantial differences in earnings uncertainty
across occupations. For instance, U.S. sales workers face higher permanent risk
than teachers. Risk also differs across the two countries; generally, the United
States is riskier than Germany. However, certain occupations are safer in the
United States than in Germany and viceversa. For example, managerial workers
face less risk in the United States whereas the opposite is true for manufacturing
workers. Although in our quantitative analysis we take these differences as exoge-
nous, they may reflect differences in the labor markets of these two countries.17
What is relevant for our analysis is how workers react to uncertain earnings and
by how much this reaction is affected by social insurance policies.
2.3 Income Tax Progressivity
The United States and Germany differ in the degree of tax progressivity. Holter,
Krueger, and Stepanchuk (2015) estimate parametric functions of the income tax
schedule for several countries. That estimation takes into account transfers and it
fits the actual schedule well except for the lowest income levels. Specifically the
tax functions take the following form,
ya = φ0y
1−φ1
p , (9)
17For example, the Kurzarbeit scheme in Germany implemented during the Great Recession
shares risk across workers. Employers reduce the average hours worked by all employees instead
of laying off some employees. A lower variance of earnings in Germany reflects to some extent
such practices.
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where ya and yp are after- and pre-tax earnings respectively. We borrow the es-
timates from Holter, Krueger, and Stepanchuk (2015) for the United States and
Germany: φ0,GER = 0.779, φ1,GER = 0.198, φ0,USA = 0.818, and φ1,USA = 0.111.18
Figure 1 show the two functions. Germany’s income tax is much more progressive
than that of the United States. In our quantitative study that follows we take these
tax functions as exogenous.
2.4 Risk and Occupational Mobility
With these estimates of earnings risk in hand, we now examine occupational mo-
bility rates. Due to restrictions in the frequency of the U.S. data, we compute
2-year mobility rates for both countries. We define those as the proportion of
workers who change occupations between two consecutive periods (being the pe-
riod, 2 years, and conditional on being present in the sample in both periods).
Occupational mobility in the United States is much higher than in Germany. We
find that on average 25% of U.S. workers change occupations, but only 3.7% of
German workers do.19
Despite the extra-insurance provided by a more progressive tax system, Ger-
many’s mobility rate is lower. However, because the level of earnings uncertainty
is so much lower in Germany than in the United States, we are rather interested
in the following question: Given a shock to earnings of the same magnitude, is a
U.S. worker more or less likely to switch occupations? To find an answer we move
beyond raw mobility rates and estimate a logit model that relates occupational
mobility to the earnings shocks experienced and to several other controls.
For the estimation of the two statistical models below, we restrict the analysis
to pre-1997 data.20 We estimate the following panel earnings regression:
yit = αi + ηH it + νit. (10)
18These parameters are for singles, since our quantitative framework does not model the house-
hold explicitly. The parameters are reported in the last column of Table 4 in Holter, Krueger, and
Stepanchuk (2015).
19Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) report that 1-year mobility rates in the United States in the
1990s are roughly 21%. Our estimate is slightly higher because we focus on 2-year rates.
20The reason is that the PSID became biennial that year.
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The notation is similar to that of equation (1): yit is log earnings per hour of
individual i at time t, αi is an individual fixed effect, and the vector H includes
several variables that help predict changes in the level of log earnings. Specifically,
we include age, sex, ethnicity, education, occupation, industry, and time dummies.
The only difference between equations (10) and (1) is that the former includes
switchers and non-switchers—hence the lack of an occupational subscript j. We
estimate this regression for each country to obtain νˆ. These estimated residuals
represent the realized shocks to earnings that individuals experience. Some of the
shocks occur while a worker is in an occupation, but some other shocks precede
an occupational switch.
We assume that the probability of switching occupations is a function of real-
ized (lagged) earnings shocks (and possibly additional variables):
Pi,t ≡ Pr(yi,t = 1 | νˆ−i,t−1) = E(yi,t | νˆ−i,t−1) = ψ(νˆ−i,t−1; β). (11)
In this specification, Pi is the probability that individual i switches occupations
and ψ is the logit function. The variable pi is a binary variable that takes the value
1 if worker i switches the occupation between period t and t + 1. The variable νˆ−
represents the negative values of νˆ; if νˆ is positive, νˆ− is set to 0.21
We label the absolute value of the coefficient associated with νˆ− the propensity
to switch. The sign is negative when a negative shock increases the likelihood of an
occupational switch. The value of the propensity to switch allows us to compare
occupational mobility between the United States and Germany for a shock of equal
value. Table 2 reports the result of the estimation for both countries. The value of
the coefficient estimated for Germany is −0.043 and for the United States is −0.03.
These numbers imply that the propensity to switch is about the same in Germany
as in the United States; actually, it is higher for Germany in this particular sample.
To summarize, vastly higher mobility rates may lead us to conclude that U.S.
21The reason for not using the raw residuals is the pattern studied by Groes, Kircher, and
Manovskii (2015). They find that when sorted by earnings, workers at both ends of the distribution
are more likely to switch occupations. The quantitative model we use below ignores occupational
switches that result from large positive earnings shocks and relates only to negative ones. For this
reason we focus on the negative values of the residual, setting other values to 0.
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workers are more responsive to shocks than German workers. Our estimates show
that this conclusion is mistaken; higher mobility rates arise naturally when shocks
are more variable. Our estimates imply a large similarity in the reaction of U.S.
and German workers to earnings shocks. A question that remains is why—if social
insurance is important— is the propensity to switch not higher in Germany than in
the United States? To answer it we need to consider other determinants influencing
the switching decision. To that end, we use a quantitative model that, calibrated to
Germany and the United States, shows that the estimated propensity to switch in
Germany would be higher if it were not for higher mobility costs. In other words,
Germany’s ample social insurance encourages mobility but this is partly offset by
higher switching costs.
3 Quantitative Model
3.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of workers who value the consumption
of a final good. Every period they are endowed with a unit of time. They live
for S periods, financing consumption using labor earnings. Workers rank levels of
consumption c of the final good according to a utility function u(c). This function
is concave, and as a result, workers dislike risk. Finally, workers do not value
leisure, supplying all of their time in a labor market described in detail below.
3.2 The Labor Market
The labor market is divided into sub markets, one for each occupation. There are J
occupations available labeled by index j from 1 to J. Occupations are mutually
exclusive; workers can work in only one occupation during any given period.
However, they may switch occupations between periods. During their tenure in
occupation j, workers receive a wage wj per unit of their human capital. Human
capital comes in two varieties. The first variety is an occupation-specific ability.
At birth, each worker is characterized by a vector {θj}Jj=1. Prior to entering the
labor market, the elements of this vector are unknown. Its values are discovered
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sequentially as workers experiment and sample different occupations. For a given
occupation j, the value of θj is revealed to the worker the first time occupation j
is tried. Once discovered, the worker retains that specific θj, even if he eventually
switches to other occupations. In what follows, it is convenient to define the set
J(s) as the set of occupations tried by (the beginning of) age s, and {θ˜}j∈J(s) as the
set of abilities for those occupations already tried.
The second type of human capital is general and therefore transferable across
occupations. The stock of this type of human capital, denoted by z, evolves over a
worker’s career. Despite its generality, the evolution of this type of human capital
depends on the worker’s current occupation. To be more specific, while work-
ing in a given occupation, z changes randomly, and the shocks that affect it are
occupation-specific. Shocks to z are an additional source of occupational mobility
and are denoted by e. Formally, while an individual works in occupation j, his
general human capital evolves according to z′ = z + ej, and ej ∼ N(0, σ2j ). We are
agnostic about the exact nature of these shocks. They capture, for example, the in-
teraction between a worker’s skills and an occupation’s response to technological
innovation. In other words, occupations react differently to changes in technology,
and given such a reaction, a worker’s human capital may suffer more or less de-
pending on his portfolio of skills. At any rate, as the evidence in Section 2.2 shows,
occupation-specific shocks to earnings are a feature of the data.
3.3 Technology
There is a set of J intermediate service producers indexed by j. We associate such
services with occupations. The quantity of intermediate service j each produces is
Xj using a linear technology in labor Nj, that is, Xj = Nj. The producer faces prices
for her service pj and wages wj. Both intermediate services and labor markets are
competitive.
The producer of intermediate service j solves the following maximization prob-
lem:
max
Nj
pjXj − Njwj, (12)
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subject to Xj = Nj. Intermediate service producers sell to a final goods producer.
To produce Y units of the final good, a Cobb-Douglas technology aggregates inter-
mediate services
{
X1, . . . , XJ
}
, 22
Y =
J
∏
j=1
{
X
αj
j
}
. (13)
The final goods producer faces purchase prices {pj}Jj=1 for the different occu-
pations. The final good is the numeraire and its price is 1. Formally, its producer
solves,
max
{X1,...,XJ}
J
∏
j=1
{
X
αj
j
}
− pjXj. (14)
Note that in equilibrium Xj = Nj and pj = wj, so the solution to this maximization
problem implicitly defines labor demand functions
{
Nj = Ndj (wj, N−j)
}J
j=1
3.4 Worker Optimization
At the beginning of the period the worker faces an occupational choice decision.
The worker knows her current level of general human capital z and the shock in
the current occupation ej. She can remain in her current occupation, with total
general human capital equal to z + ej and known ability θj. Alternatively, she can
try another occupation. Some of the alternatives have never been tried before and
for those the ability θ is unknown. Define by Ws(Ωs, z, e, j) the maximum value
an age-s agent obtains by choosing among J mutually exclusive occupations. This
choice depends on the set of occupations the worker has visited before J(s− 1), as
well as her associated abilities {θj}j∈J(s−1). These two elements make up Ωs. The
choice also depends on the current stock of general human capital z, its current
innovation e, and the current occupation j.
The following expression formally describes the choice between a known occu-
pation j and a set of alternative occupations j′.
Ws(Ωs, z, e, j) = max
{
Vs(Ωs, z, e, j), {Vs(Ωs, z, j′)}j′ 6=j
}
.
22We assume no capital in this version but it is an easy-to-add feature.
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The value of remaining in the current occupation j, Vs(Ωs, z, e, j), is conditional
on a particular value of the random variable e (the shock to general human capital
z). Alternative occupations—those labeled j′—never depend on ej′ and depend on
θj′ only if it is already known—that is, if the worker has worked in j′ at some point
in his past.
The value of staying is given by the maximum value attained by working in
occupation j:
Vs(Ωs, z, e, j) =
{
u(c) + β
∫
Ws+1(Ωs+1, z′, e′, j)dFj(e′)
}
, s.to
c = T
(
wjeθj ezee
)
(15)
z′ = z + e (16)
Ωs+1 = Ωs (17)
The continuation value is the maximum among J occupations, knowing that
productivity in occupation j will experience a shock e′. The flow budget con-
straint (15) equates consumption to total income, which is simply after-tax earn-
ings T(wjeθj ezee). Pre tax earnings are equal to the product of a wage rate wj and
the amount of efficiency units ezeθj ee. A progressive tax function T(·) applied to
pre tax earnings gives the after-tax amount available to finance expenditures. Re-
call that this function is given by ya = T(yp) = φ0y
1−φ1
p , where yp and ya are pre-
and after-tax earnings, respectively.23
The (log of) general human capital z evolves according to (16). The current
shock e is added to the stock z to update it to its new value z′. Finally, remaining
in the same occupation adds no new information to Ωs, and as a result Ωs+1 = Ωs.
By switching occupations a worker bets that his performance will improve as
a result of the change. If the worker has chosen that occupation for the first time,
the outcome is uncertain because both e and θ in that prospective occupation are
unknown. The worker takes expectations with respect to both distributions to
compute the value of the alternative occupation. If at some point the worker has
23We assume government revenues are wasted.
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tried occupation j′, only the value of e is uncertain.
Recall that Ω includes the set J(s− 1), the set of inspected occupations. If j′ is
not an element of J(s− 1), the value of the alternative occupation is
Vs
(
Ωs, z, j′
)
=
∫
Vs
(
Ωs, θ, z, e, j′
)
dGj′(θ)dFj′(e). (18)
Conditional on a particular θ and e, the value of the alternative occupation is the
maximum attained by adding the utility flow from earnings plus the continuation
value:
Vs(Ωs, θj′ , z, e, j′) =
{
u(c) + β
∫
Ws+1(Ωs+1, z′, e′, j′)dFj′ (e
′)
}
, s.to (19)
c = T
(
wj′eze
θj′ eej′ e−c(s,κ)
)
(20)
z′ = z + e′j (21)
Ωs+1 =
{
Ωs, j′, θj′
}
. (22)
This value is similar to that of remaining in the same occupation. There are two
differences. First, according to (22) the set Ωs grows, because the worker obtains
new information about his ability in the new occupation j′. The second differ-
ence is the term e−c(s,κ), affecting the amount of efficiency units and reflecting a
(temporary) human capital loss. This cost is borne by all switchers, regardless of
whether the new occupation has been tried before. The function c(s, κ) reflects
mobility costs; it depends on age and on a vector of parameters κ. This specifica-
tion permits modeling in a flexible way the mobility costs facing workers as they
age.
Evaluating an occupation j′ that has been visited before is simpler. The only
uncertainty facing the worker is with respect to the shock e in j′. The alternative
value for this case—the analog to equation (18)—can be written as
Vs
(
Ωs, z, j′
)
=
∫
Vs
(
Ωs, z, e, j′
)
dFj′(e). (23)
Note that the ability parameter θj′ is an element of Ωs, because the worker has
previously visited that occupation. The calculation of the value of switching is
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almost identical to (19)-(22). The exception is equation (22), which now becomes
(17): The set Ωs does not change because no new information is revealed about the
worker’s innate abilities.
The previous description of the occupational decision problem holds for all
periods except the first one. In the first period a fraction f j of workers is exoge-
nously assigned to occupation j. These workers learn their comparative advantage
in that occupation but experience no e shocks (i.e., their z is 0). In the second and
subsequent periods they optimally choose their occupation as described above.
3.5 Equilibrium
Let us denote the policy function that describes the occupational decision of an
individual of age s characterized by a realization e, a set Ωs and productivity z,
who is currently in occupation j′ and who switches to occupation j by Ij,s(j′,ω, z, e).
For aggregation purposes it is necessary to specify the position of individuals
across states. Let Ψj,s(Ωs, z, e) be the mass of individuals of age s in occupation j,
with productivity z, and shock e who have been in other occupations in the past
with their respective ability, represented by Ωs. The measure Ψ is defined for all
the possible values of Ωs, z and e that belong to sets that are Borel subsets of R.
The dynamic evolution of the mass of individuals reads as follows. As de-
scribed above, the mass of newborns in occupation j is exogenously determined
and given by f j. Thus, for s = 0,
Ψj,0(Ω0, z, e) =
1
S
f j ∀ j ∈ {1, ..., J}.
In addition, since individuals live S number of years, we have that for S + 1,
Ψj,S+1(ΩS + 1, z, e) = 0 ∀ j ∈ {1, ..., J}.
For 0 < s < S, Ψ obeys the following recursion
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Ψj,s+1(Ωs+1, z, e) =∑
j′
Ψj,s(Ωs, z, e)Ij,s(j′,ωs, e) ∀ j′ ∈ {1, ..., J}.24
The aggregate mass of efficiency units in each occupation is thus given by
Nj =
1
S ∑s∈S
∫
ezeθj′ eej′dΨj,s(Ωs, z, e) +
1
S ∑s∈S
∑
j 6=j′
∫
e−c(s,κ)dΨj′,s−1(Ωs−1, z, e)
.
We can now define a stationary competitive equilibrium that consists of (i)
a set of occupation-level wages
{
wj
}J
j=1; (ii) occupation populations (or masses){
ψj
}J
j=1, (iii) a set of intermediate goods prices
{
pj
}J
j=1; (iv) occupation-level efficiency-
weighted employment levels
{
Nj
}J
j=1; and (v) occupation-specific decision rules{
Ij,s
}J
j=1 and associated value functions {Vs}
S
s=1 that satisfy the following condi-
tions:
1. The labor inputs Nj are the solution to the intermediate producer optimiza-
tion problem.
2. The intermediate goods quantities Xj solve the final goods producer’s prob-
lem.
3. Prices pj equate supply and demand of intermediate goods.
4. The wage in occupation j is the marginal product of a unit of efficiency in
that occupation:
wj = αjN
αj−1
j ∏
j′ 6=j
{
Nj′
α′j
}
.
5. Labor markets clear at the occupational level.
6. In a given occupation j, Ψj is the stationary distribution.
By Walras’s law, the market for the final good also clears.
24Note that j′ can take the value j since there is a mass of individuals who were in j and stay in j.
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4 Quantitative Analysis
4.1 Parameter Values
We separately calibrate our model economy to German and U.S. data; the cali-
bration strategy is identical for the two economies. There is a set of parameters
common to the two countries and a set of parameters that differ. The common
set of parameters includes the period frequency, the number of occupations J, the
discount factor β, the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ,25 and the life span S.
We restrict the analysis to an economy with three occupations grouped accord-
ing the level of risk: safe (S), medium (M), and risky R.26 The model period is
set equal to 1 year and a worker’s lifetime S is 35 years. We set the relative risk-
aversion coefficient γ equal to 3, and the discount factor β equal to 0.96. The value
for γ is well within the range of typically used figures. The value for β is consis-
tent with a real interest rate of 4% in an infinite-horizon economy with complete
markets when the period is one year.
The values for the remaining parameters are country-specific. We choose values
so that our model economy replicates features of the actual economy. We assume
that the distribution of shocks to human capital z and the distribution of abilities
θ are normal:
ej ∼ N(−0.5σ2e,j, σ2e,j), (24)
θj ∼ N(−0.5σ2θ,j, σ2θ,j), (25)
for j in {S, M, R}. We also assume a quadratic mobility cost function c(s, κ):
c(s, κ) = κ0 + κ1s + κ2s2 (26)
25The utility function u(c) is of the constant relative risk-aversion class:
u(c) =
c1−γ
1− γ .
26We rank the 12 occupations by the variance of the permanent shock. The S group of occupations
is defined as those with the lowest level of risk and include around 25% of workers. Analogously,
the R group is the set of occupations with the highest permanent risk that include around 25% of
workers.
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The set of parameters that are country-specific is
Λ =
{
κ0, κ1, κ2,
{
σ2e,j, f j, σ
2
θ,j, αj
}
j∈S,M,R
}
,
where we have included the new parameters fS, fM, and fR that refer to the initial
fractions of workers in each of the three occupations. It is important to note that
we do not take the variances as estimated in the empirical part; we calibrate them.
By that we mean that the set of
{
σ2e,j
}J
j=1
includes parameters to be estimated
jointly so that the model delivers a set of moments described below. Since the
reduced-form econometric procedure described in Section 2.2 does not consider
occupational change, its estimated variances underestimate the true uncertainty
workers experience. The reason is simply selection: large negative shocks to labor
earnings are the reason workers switch occupations.
The value of some of these parameters can be calculated directly from the data.
First, the parameters fS, fM, and fR correspond to the fractions of the youngest
group of workers in each of the three occupations. Of the 26-years-old, 32.5%
work in the safe occupation in the United States and 32.95% in Germany. For
the medium and the risky occupations, there is more disparity across the two
economies. For the medium-risk occupation, the fraction is close to a half for
Germany (47.62%) while it is less than 40% for the United States (38.2%). The
labor share parameters αj for j ∈ {S, M, R} can be computed outside the model as
well. Because the final good employs occupation services, and the amount of those
services equals the total amount of efficient units of labor provided by workers in
that occupation, αj represents the wage bill in occupation j as a share of the total
wage bill. Therefore, one can calculate αj as total earnings in occupation j as a
fraction of total earnings across all occupations.27
We choose the values for remaining country-specific parameters so that the
model matches a set of moments from the data. Table 3 displays their values
for the United States (first column) and for Germany (second column). We first
consider the mobility of workers across occupations. In particular, one of the
27Because production of the final good does not require capital, total output is equal to the total
wage bill.
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moments to match is the average 2-year mobility rates for the young, middle-aged,
and old workers.28 As before, we compute 2-year mobility rates for each age
group (for a total of 33 age groups). We then take the average of those for the 28-
to-38-year-olds (young), the 39-to-49-year-olds (middle-aged), and those 50 years
or older (old). Section 2.4 reports that mobility is much higher in the United States
than in Germany and the difference is largest for young workers. In the United
States, about 22.36% of young workers switch occupations in 2 years. This fraction
drops to only 19.74% for the middle-aged and to 17.97% for the older group. The
corresponding figures for Germany are 4.1%, 2.1%, and 0.9%.
We also target (i) the variance of the log earnings for the 26-year-olds (by occu-
pation) and (ii) the standard deviation of the permanent shocks to labor earnings,
also by occupation. To be clear, the variances of permanent shocks to earnings
calculated in Section 2.2 are moments for the model to match. Recall that these are
estimated for a panel of workers using spells of work in the same occupation. The
model counterpart to those moments is computed in an identical way using the
methodology described in Section 2.2. Because we aggregate to 3 occupations, we
compute the averages of the standard deviations calculated for our original group
of 12 occupations (properly weighted).
The middle three rows of Table 3 show the variances of log earnings for the
youngest age group in our sample for both Germany and the United States. The
variances in Germany are lower than those in the United States by a factor of about
4 for the safest occupation (0.191 vs. 0.052) and a factor of roughly 2 for the riskiest
(0.165 vs. 0.089). The variability of permanent shocks to earnings is also higher for
U.S. workers—so much so that the variance of the riskiest occupation in Germany
is equal to that of the safest occupation in the United States (0.101).
Table 4 displays the values of the parameters for the U.S. and German economies.
Mobility costs are higher in Germany than in the United States. Potentially, they
could be key in explaining the differences in occupational mobility between these
two countries. However, below we show that these higher mobility costs matter
28Mobility rates now are defined as switches among our 3 occupations grouped by risk, not the
original 12 occupations considered earlier.
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little in explaining the differences in mobility rates. The main factor is actually the
cross-country differences in the variability of shocks to θ and to e. As expected,
the calibrated variances of the permanent shocks to earnings (the “true” variances
of permanent shocks facing workers) are larger than those estimated from spells
in the same occupation in Section 2.2 (the targeted moments).
Table 5 shows the targeted moments and the model-simulated moments for the
two economies using the parameter values in Table 4. The two sets of numbers are
virtually indistinguishable. The only exception is perhaps mobility for the young
in Germany, for which the model delivers too high a rate.
Solving the model for the set of parameter values just described delivers an
equilibrium distribution of earnings within and across occupations. In equilib-
rium, individuals’ earnings depend on the occupation wage, and on the realiza-
tions of the occupation-specific abilities and the shocks to general human capital.
In equilibrium, average earnings within an occupation depend on the wage rate
for that occupation and the efficiency units of the workers who selected into that
occupation. However, insofar as the variances of the shocks affect the sorting of
risk-averse workers, they influence the equilibrium distribution of earnings across
occupations as well.
In addition to the baseline model economy, we consider three counterfactual
economies that are useful for exploring the mechanisms present in the model. At
the same time, they are also useful for assessing how changes in taxation affect
prices and allocations. In the first counterfactual we assign the tax function of Ger-
many to the U.S. economy (and vice versa). In the second counterfactual, we force
workers to face the other country’s risk to general human capital. Finally, in the
third counterfactual we set θ to 0, so that the innate ability in each occupation is 1
for each worker. In Tables 6, 7, and 8 we present the results for the eight economies
we consider (four economies for each country). The next sections summarize these
results.
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4.2 The Effect of Social Insurance: Tax Reforms
We first analyze the U.S. economy with the more progressive German income tax.
All other parameters remain the same.29 The third column of Table 6 presents
the results. Giving U.S. workers more social insurance raises occupational mobil-
ity. Workers now switch on average 4.3 times over their lifetimes (38.7% higher
than in the baseline). The average mobility rate over the life cycle is now 20% (1.5
percentage points higher than in the baseline). More insurance encourages exper-
imentation. The discovery of one’s innate abilities happens sooner. Also, risky
occupations become more attractive, but because they are risky, large number of
workers leave those occupations as well.
The higher mobility rate leads to a better assignment of workers to occupations.
That better assignment leads to sizable increases in output: It rises from 0.728 to
0.755 (an increase of 3.65%). Inequality, measured by the variance of log earnings,
rises from 0.7 to 0.722 (third line). Note, however, that earnings here refer to pre
tax earnings. More social insurance leads to a lower volatility of after-tax earnings.
To summarize, more social insurance, everything else constant, raises aggregate
output and increases mobility.
The fourth column of Table 7 shows the shares of workers and mean earnings
in each occupation. Both in the baseline economy and in the counterfactual the
medium-risk occupation is the largest. The smallest is also the riskiest, which
also happens to have the highest level of mean earnings. In both cases there is a
positive correlation between the level of risk and mean earnings, confirming the
results of Cubas and Silos (2017). The higher the risk workers face, the higher
the mean earnings. This result is a consequence of the selection of the highest-
productivity workers. Compared with the baseline economy, the economy with
German taxes exhibits a larger risky occupation, a similar-in-size safe occupation,
and a smaller medium-risk occupation. With more insurance, the risky occupation
becomes more attractive, and so in equilibrium more workers select into it. As a
29This is a revenue-neutral experiment. We adjust the parameter φ0 in the tax function, so that
the revenue-to-GDP ratio are the same in the U.S. baseline economy and in the U.S. economy with
German progressivity.
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result, the marginal worker in the risky occupation is of lower ability, contributing
to the lower mean earnings.
To investigate the welfare effects of such a policy change, we compute the
consumption equivalent variation (CEV). This measure is the uniform percent-
age change in consumption, at each date and in each event, needed to make a
household indifferent between being born into the baseline economy (the U.S. tax
system) and being born into the counterfactual economy (the United States with
the German tax system). A positive CEV reflects a welfare increase caused by the
policy change. Table 8 shows the results. The second column shows that when U.S.
workers enjoy Germany’s insurance their welfare rises by 2.55%. There are two rea-
sons for this increase. First, it is a result of the standard consumption-smoothing
because of the extra insurance. Second, the higher output, a consequence of the
better assignment of workers to occupations.
The seventh column of Table 6 shows the results of the alternative experiment:
assigning to Germany the less progressive tax system of the United States. Con-
trary to the previous case and, as expected, occupational mobility declines. This
is clear by observing the seventh column of Table 6, which shows the decrease of
both the average times workers change occupations (from 0.45 in the baseline to
0.35) and the average mobility rate (from 2.5% to 2%). Because U.S. labor taxation
discourages risk-taking, workers experiment less. The lower degree of experimen-
tation leads to lower-quality matches. Aggregate output suffers as a result, and
relative to the baseline German economy, this counterfactual economy yields 2.6%
fewer goods. Pre tax earnings inequality, measured by the variance of log earnings,
falls as well. However, because U.S. taxes are less progressive, after-tax earnings
inequality rises. The fifth column of Table 7 shows that there is a substantial in-
crease in the proportion of workers in the risky occupation. Compared with the
baseline economy, this economy is much less uncertain. Recall that the riskiest
occupation in Germany is as risky as the safest occupation in the United States As
a result, the proportion of workers in the safest and medium-risk occupations de-
creases. Consequently, mean earnings decrease in all occupations but much more
in the risky one due to the inclusion of low-productivity workers.
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Regarding the share—measured by the fraction of workers—in each occupa-
tion, the results of this counterfactual exercise are qualitatively similar. With less
insurance, the fraction of German workers in the risky occupation is almost the
same but there are fewer of them in the medium-risk occupation and more in the
safe one. Again, as for the United States, there is also compensation for risk in
Germany. We also compute CEV for this case and find there are substantial wel-
fare losses, especifically on the order of 4.5% compared with the baseline German
economy. As shown below, the combination of high earnings (i.e., consumption)
volatility and lower output is responsible for large welfare losses from adopting
this policy.
We estimate the logit regressions presented in the empirical part but use model-
generated data. Specifically, we regress the occupational mobility and the realiza-
tion of the negative shocks of the calibrated stochastic process. Table 9 shows the
effect of insurance on occupational mobility. For the United States (columns 2 and
3), as more insurance is provided to workers, the more workers change occupations
and thus the coefficient is negative and larger (in absolute value) than the baseline
case. The same effect is observed for Germany when we assign their workers the
lower level of U.S. insurance; the coefficient is still negative but smaller in absolute
value.
4.3 The Effect of Earning Shocks: United States versus Germany
Our second counterfactual is to assign each of the baseline economies the earnings
shocks of the other. In this way, we explore the implications of changing the
magnitude of the permanent shocks to the general human capital (exogenous in
our model) on the same set of macroeconomic aggregates.
We start by analyzing the U.S. economy but now with the shocks of the mag-
nitude estimated for Germany. As shown in the fourth column of Table 6, as
expected, when U.S. workers face much lower permanent shocks to earnings, mo-
bility rates drop substantially: The average mobility rate is almost 14 percentage
points lower than in the baseline economy (from 18.5% to a value of 4.9%). The av-
erage occupational changes fall from 4.3 to 0.97. This drop implies that Germany’s
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lower shocks volatility is responsible for its low mobility rates. Higher mobility
costs play a minor role. Because the high-productivity workers are much less pro-
ductive (the right tail is much shorter now), aggregate output falls by close to 40%.
Earnings inequality falls almost in the same proportion as well because there is
less experimentation owing to the fact workers have fewer risk taking opportuni-
ties and, as a result, the equilibrium earnings distribution shrinks.
Although output significantly drops, workers now live in an economy with
permanent shocks that are substantially lower in magnitude (the variance of shocks
are on average one quarter of those estimated for the baseline economy); thus, this
effect dominates and as a result renders a welfare gain of 3.73% (see the third
column in Table 8).
In the same way, we assign German workers the permanent shocks of the U.S.
economy. Everything else equal, German workers will now live in a much riskier
economy, although this economy will offer them better opportunities. As a result,
occupational mobility substantially increases as shown in the fourth column of
Table 6. The average occupational change during a worker’s lifetime increases from
0.35 to 2.16 and the average mobility rate increases almost 10 percentage points
(from 2% to 11.8%). As noted earlier, the magnitude of the permanent shocks
explains the bulk of the cross-country differences in the observed occupational
mobility. The large increase in mobility results in a better sorting of workers and
thus a substantially higher level of output, which increases by 23%. Because of the
better sorting inequality increases.
As in the case of the tax reforms, we run the logit regressions using the out-
put of the model in these counterfactual exercises. Table 9 shows the effect of the
shocks on occupational mobility. For the United States (columns 2 and 4), as work-
ers face shocks lower in magnitude compared with the baseline, the propensity to
change occupations decreases. On the contrary, when German workers face the
larger U.S. shocks, the propensity to switch increases.
There is no contradiction in finding that a lower variance of shocks decreases
mobility, but a lower variance of earnings — because of more progressive taxes —
increases mobility. With more progressive taxes, the cutoff value of productivity
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that induces a worker to stay in an occupation, rises. Because the distribution
of shocks remains the same, there is now a higher probability of a realization
below this cutoff value, encouraging the worker to switch. When the variance of
earnings shocks decreases, the uncertain occupation becomes more attractive. This
increases mobility, everything else constant. However, low realizations of shocks
are now less likely — because of the lower variance — which reduces mobility.
The second effect dominates.
4.4 The Case of Homogeneous Workers
The last counterfactual economy we examine is one in which there is no hetero-
geneity in ex ante abilities to work in different occupations or comparative advan-
tages. Specifically, in this counterfactual economy, abilities for working in different
occupations are the same and normalized to unity. In this way, we eliminate the
mobility that occurs for the process of discovery of workers comparative advan-
tage.
In both countries, occupational mobility increases (see columns 5 and 9 in Table
6). Without occupation-specific abilities, workers have worse occupation matches
and thus they are less attached to them. As a result, for the same shocks they
move more often than in the baseline case. The changes in the shares of workers in
each occupation are small compared with the previous counterfactuals, and mean
earnings in each of them change in the same direction as previously observed.
As already mentioned, the fact that θ is set to 1, produces worse matches of
workers into occupations compared with the baseline case in which workers have
occupation-specific abilities. This worse sorting lowers productivity and, as a re-
sult, output. Output is 13% lower for the United States and 8.5% lower for Ger-
many. Although occupational mobility is higher, the fact that workers are much
more similar compared to the baseline case (ex ante homogeneous) implies that
pre tax earnings volatility also decreases in both countries. For the United States
the variance of log earnings decreases from 0.7 in the baseline to 0.559 when θ is 1.
In Germany the variance of log earnings drops from 0.179 to 0.127. Interestingly,
these experiments allow us to explore the sources of earnings inequality. For the
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United States, the magnitude of the drop in the variance of log earnings in the
counterfactual exercise shows that about 20% of the inequality is due to shocks to
θ, while the remainder is due to e-shocks. In Germany, 30% of the inequality is
due to shocks to θ.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper uncovers a new mechanism through which social insurance policies
improve the matching of workers to occupations. It does so by proposing a dy-
namic framework in which insurance mitigates the natural uncertainty of career
changes. At the early stages of a worker’s career, that uncertainty is mainly about
occupation-specific innate abilities. Later in the life cycle, earnings risk in prospec-
tive occupations becomes more important. Insurance through redistributive tax-
ation induces workers to bet on career changes, helping them to find their best
occupational fit. To quantify the importance of this channel, we take a close look
at earnings and occupation dynamics of two economies: Germany and the United
States.
We document new facts on earnings risk and its relationship with occupational
mobility for Germany and the United States. We find that workers experience
substantial earnings uncertainty and that earning shocks are occupation-specific.
In addition, cross-country differences in earnings volatility explain the bulk of
differences in occupational mobility across countries. Equipped with a quantita-
tive model that describes those data well, we find that better insurance leads to
substantial increases in output and welfare, as well as changes in pre tax earnings
inequality. Our findings appear to support proposals such as Denmark’s Flexicurity
policies. Those policies stress the importance of maintaining a fluid and flexible
labor market, while insulating workers from adverse earnings shocks. This paper
shows that the second aspect of the policy partly determines the first: insurance
begets mobility. The model shown here can be the starting point for the evaluation
of specific policies in which risk, insurance, and career mobility are fundamental
elements.
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To focus on our proposed main mechanism, we abstract from many aspects of
the labor market. The omissions may also account in part for individuals’ occu-
pational choices. For instance, we take earnings volatility as exogenous. Nonethe-
less, that volatility is key in explaining cross-country differences in mobility. We
hope that these and other findings encourage future research on what causes the
observed risk across countries and across occupations to vary so widely. For in-
stance, exploring the role of labor market institutions and technological change in
explaining cross-country differences in the variance of shocks seems a promising
avenue.
We believe our paper offers a new perspective for understanding labor mar-
kets, as well as providing new insights on the welfare effects of missing insurance
markets. For instance, our results on inequality shed light on the effect of policies
targeted to modify initial conditions and those directed at shocks over an individ-
ual’s working lifetime.
Finally, other types of extensions can also deliver important results. For ex-
ample, our work has focused on one policy—income taxation—but other types of
policies could have similar effects: the provision of health insurance or transfers
targeted at children, among others. In addition, the model could be enriched by in-
corporating self-insurance with a more or less rich asset structure. That extension
can yield intriguing insights about the interaction of private and social insurance
in determining workers’ career choices.
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Tables
Table 1: Standard Deviation Permanent Shock
United States Germany
Occupation σe Ranking No. σe Ranking No.
Workers Workers
1 Professionals and technicians 0.091 4 436 0.096 5 1326
2 Athletes, artists, religion 0.198 11 313 0.128 11 693
3 Managerial Workers 0.128 8 674 0.149 12 681
4 Clerical workers 0.113 6 448 0.058 1 1502
5 Administrative workers 0.064 1 281 0.114 9 899
6 Sales workers 0.206 12 335 0.102 6 812
7 Service workers 0.089 3 319 0.073 3 1641
8 Teachers 0.124 7 404 0.113 8 825
9 Medical workers 0.186 10 451 0.114 10 177
10 Manufacturing workers 0.088 2 179 0.059 2 480
11 Production workers. 0.130 9 516 0.106 7 1777
12 Constructors, painters, transportation 0.104 5 634 0.075 4 1447
Weighted Average 0.130 0.093
Note: The table displays the estimated values for the standard deviations of the permanent shocks to earnings (σe) for the
United States and Germany (columns 2 and 5, respectively) for each of the 12 occupations considered. In addition it presents
their ranking (Ranking) in terms of the magnitude of the estimated value as well as the number of workers (No. Workers)
in each occupation for the sample used in the estimation.
Table 2: Logit Regression: United States vs. Germany
United States Germany
νˆ− −0.030 −0.043
(0.010) (0.005)
Note: The table displays the results of running a logit regression of the occupation-
switching decision on the negative of the earnings residuals (u−1 = min{u, 0})
(second and third columns). The second column shows the result for the PSID
and the third column shows the result for the SOEP.
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Figure 1: The figure plots the tax functions for Germany and United States esti-
mated in Holter, Krueger, and Stepanchuk (2015)
Table 3: Targeted Moments: United States and Germany
USA Germany
Mob. rate young 0.224 0.041
Mob. rate mid-age 0.197 0.021
Mob. rate old 0.180 0.010
Var. log earnings S 0.191 0.052
Var log earnings M 0.159 0.063
Var. log earnings R 0.165 0.089
SD risk S 0.101 0.063
SD risk M 0.146 0.075
SD risk R 0.217 0.101
Note: The table displays the moments and the values targeted in the estimation of
the model for the US and Germany. Mob, mobility; M, medium; R, risky; S, safe;
SD, standard deviation; Var., variance.
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Table 4: Estimated Parameters: United States and Germany
USA Germany
κ0 1.174 1.625
κ1(10−3) 1.273 0.240
κ2(10−3) −0.942 −0.808
σe,S 0.109 0.063
σe,M 0.158 0.076
σe,R 0.271 0.101
σ2θ,S 0.191 0.052
σ2θ,M 0.159 0.063
σ2θ,R 0.165 0.089
Note: The table displays the value of the estimated parameters of
the model for United States and Germany.
Table 5: Model Fit (Data vs. Model): United States and Germany
United States Germany
Data Model Data Model
Mob. rate young 0.224 0.221 0.041 0.046
Mob. rate mid-age 0.197 0.169 0.021 0.019
Mob. rate old 0.180 0.168 0.010 0.009
Var. log earnings S 0.191 0.190 0.052 0.052
Var log earnings M 0.159 0.159 0.063 0.063
Var. log earnings R 0.165 0.164 0.089 0.089
SD risk S 0.101 0.102 0.063 0.062
SD risk M 0.146 0.143 0.075 0.075
SD risk R 0.217 0.212 0.101 0.101
Note: The table displays the fit of the model by presenting the values of the tar-
geted moments in the data and their model counterparts. Mob, mobility; M,
medium; R, risky; S, safe; SD, standard deviation; Var., variance.
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Table 6: Model Summary: Baseline vs. Counterfactuals
United States Germany
Baseline Taxes Shocks No θ Baseline Taxes Shocks No θ
GER GER USA USA
Avg. occ. changes 3.916 4.303 0.970 5.321 0.446 0.350 2.161 0.371
Avg. mob. rate 0.185 0.200 0.049 0.265 0.025 0.020 0.118 0.022
Var. log earnings 0.700 0.722 0.230 0.559 0.179 0.179 0.537 0.127
Aggregate output 0.728 0.755 0.444 0.633 0.382 0.372 0.468 0.350
Relative to Baseline
Avg. occ. changes (∆) 0.387 −2.946 1.406 −0.096 1.715 −0.075
Avg. mob. rate (∆) 0.015 −0.136 0.081 −0.005 0.093 −0.003
Var. log earnings (∆) 0.022 −0.470 −0.141 −0.000 0.358 −0.053
Aggregate output (∆%) 3.65% −39.06% −13.07% −2.63% 22.58% −8.47%
Note: The table present the results of the quantitative model. It shows the value of the average number of occupational changes, the
mobility rate, the variances of log earnings and aggregate output for the United States (columns 2 to 5) and Germany (columns 6 to 9).
The values of columns 2 and 5 refer to the baseline case. Columns 3 and 7 refer to the counterfactual exercise in which each country
has the tax policy of the other: Taxes GER is the case of the United States with the tax code of Germany, and Taxes USA is the case of
Germany with the tax code of the United States. Columns 4 and 8 refer to the counterfactual exercise in which each country has the
earnings shocks of the other—specifically, the standard deviation of the permanent shocks. Shocks GER is the case of the United States
with the shocks of Germany and Shocks USA is the case of Germany with the shocks of the United States. Columns 5 and 9, labeled
as “No θ”, refer to the counterfactual exercise in which workers are ex ante homogeneous. The first panel presents the levels and the
second the change with respect to the baseline case. Avg., average; mob., mobility; occ., occupational; Var., variance.
Table 7: Model Summary: Baseline vs. Counterfactuals
United States Germany
Baseline Taxes Shocks No θ Baseline Taxes Shocks No θ
GER GER USA USA
Occ. shares
Safe (S) 0.319 0.320 0.228 0.341 0.247 0.257 0.376 0.254
Medium (M) 0.465 0.456 0.424 0.414 0.423 0.409 0.388 0.416
Risky (R) 0.215 0.224 0.347 0.245 0.331 0.334 0.237 0.330
Mean earnings
Safe (S) 0.476 0.491 0.405 0.388 0.352 0.334 0.298 0.320
Medium (M) 0.672 0.712 0.447 0.657 0.368 0.366 0.481 0.338
Risky (R) 1.224 1.217 0.465 0.933 0.422 0.409 0.717 0.387
Note: The table presents the results of the quantitative model for the United States (columns 3 to 6) and Germany (columns 7 to 10). It
shows the value of the occupational shares (first panel) and mean earnings (second panel) in each of the 3 occupations considered (the
12 occupations grouped in 3 groups according to their level of risk): safe (S), medium (M) and risky (R) groups. The values of columns
3 and 7 refer to the baseline case. Columns 4 and 8 refer to the counterfactual exercise in which each country has the tax policy of
the other: Taxes GER is the case of the United States with the tax code of Germany, and Taxes USA is the case of Germany with the
tax code of the United States. Columns 5 and 9 refer to the counterfactual exercise in which each country has the earnings shocks of
the other—specifically, the standard deviation of the permanent shocks. Shocks GER is the case of the United States with the shocks of
Germany, and Shocks USA is the case of Germany with the shocks of the United States. Columns 6 and 10, labeled as “No θ”, refer to
the counterfactual exercise in which workers are ex ante homogeneous. The first panel present the levels and the second the change with
respect to the baseline case. Occ, occupation.
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Table 8: Welfare Gains Relative to Baseline
United States
Taxes GER Shocks GER No θ
% Welfare from baseline 2.55 3.73 1.60
Germany
Taxes USA Shocks USA No θ
% Welfare from baseline −4.55 −9.09 1.31
Note: The table presents the welfare calculations using the quantitative model for the United
States (first panel) and Germany (second panel). It shows the uniform percentage change in
consumption, at each date and in each event, needed to make a household indifferent between
being born into the baseline economy and being born into each of counterfactual economies.
Taxes USA (second column of first panel) is the case of Germany with the tax code of the
United States. Taxes GER (second column of second panel) is the case of the United States
with the tax code of Germany. Shocks USA is the case of Germany with the shocks of the
United States (third column of first panel). Shocks GER is the case of the United States with the
shocks of Germany (third column of second panel). The column labeled as “No θ” refers to the
counterfactual exercises in which workers are ex ante homogeneous.
Table 9: Logit Regression: Model-Simulated Panel
United States Germany
Baseline Taxes Baseline Taxes
GER USA
u− −0.689 −0.812 −0.056 −0.042
Age −31.805× 10−4 −47.194× 10−4 −2.586× 10−4 −2.350× 10−4
Age2 0.410× 10−4 0.841× 10−4 0.006× 10−4 0.016× 10−4
Note: The table displays the results of fitting a logit model to the occupation-switching decision on
the negative of the earnings residuals (u− = min{u, 0}), age, age squared, and occupational dummies
(coefficients not shown). Baseline (columns 2 and 4) refers to the baseline economy. Taxes GER
(column 3) is the case of the United States with the tax code of Germany, and Taxes USA (column 5)
is the case of Germany with the tax code of the United States.
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Appendix (For Online Publication)
6 Data and Sample Selection
The main data sources are U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) (see Schupp, Kroh, Goebel, Bartsch, Gies-
selmann, Grabka, Krause, Liebau, Richter, Schmitt, Schnitzlein, Peter, and Tucci
(2013)) provided by the Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF) at Ohio State Uni-
versity (see Frick, Jenkings, Lillard, Lipps, and Wooden (2007)). The CNEF defines
a set of variables of these data sets in a consistent way so the data sets are compa-
rable.30
For the PSID we use the data from 1981 through 2007, whereas for the SOEP
we use the data from 1984 through 2012. Our sample selection procedure can be
summarized as follows:
• The analysis is restricted to individuals between the ages of 26 and 60 years.
• We eliminate individuals who are not employed and those with zero earnings
and zero hours of work.
• We eliminate individuals for for whom the information on sex, marital status,
and education is missing.
• The analysis is restricted to individuals who are employed and report annual
work hours of more than 1040 and less than 5110.
• We use earnings in real terms that are obtained using a consumer price index
deflator for the United States and Germany. For the United States we elim-
inate those with earnings per hours less than 1 and more than 300 (in 1983
dollars). For the German data we eliminate those whose earnings per hour
are less than 8.5 euros and more than 572 (in 2010 euros).
30The CNEF provides data for other countries as well; some are publicly available at
https://cnef.ehe.osu.edu/data/ (PSID), while for other countries (i.e., SOEP) there are additional
steps to follow to obtain the data.
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• The analysis is restricted to individuals with at least 8 consecutive periods of
data.
• We eliminate individuals for whom the industry or occupation classification
is missing.
• For the United States, the CNEF data on occupations are provided follow-
ing the ISCO-68 classification of the International Labor Organization (ILO).
The SOEP data on occupations are provided following the 4-digit ISCO-88
classification, a revision of the ISCO-68 coding made by the ILO. The CNEF
provides the conversion of occupations from the ISCO-88 coding to the ISCO-
68 coding to make the two countries comparable. The CNEF provides data
on 83 different occupations and the categories correspond to either 2-specific
categories or sub groups of the ISCO68. We further group occupations be-
cause after all our restrictions are imposed in the sample there are very few
workers in some occupations. We group them by closely following the cri-
teria of ISCO-68 to group occupations according to their similarities in the
skills required to perform them. The ISCO-68 major groups are 9; in our case
we have 12 occupational groups as specified in Table 6. We eliminated sol-
diers; farmers, agricultural and animal husbandry workers; forestry workers
and fishermen; hunters and related workers.
Table A.1: Occupation Classification
Occupation CNEF Occupations
1 Professionals and technicians
Physical scientists and related technicians
Architects, engineers and related technicians
Aircraft and ships’ officers
Life scientists and related technicians
Statisticians, mathematicians, systems analysts and related technicians
Economists
2 Athletes, Artists, Religion
Accountants
Jurists
Workers in religion
Authors, journalists and related writers
Sculptors, painters, photographers and related creative artists
Composers and performing artists
Athletes, sportsmen and related workers
Professional, technical and related workers not elsewhere classified
3 Managerial Workers Legislative officials and government administrators; managers
Continued on next page
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Occupation CNEF Occupations
4 Clerical Workers
Clerical supervisors
Government executive officials
Clerical and related workers not elsewhere classified
5 Administrative Workers
Stenographers, typists and card- and tape-punching machine operators
Bookkeepers, cashiers and related workers
Computing machine operators
Transport and communications supervisors
Transport conductors
Mail distribution clerks
Telephone and telegraph operators
6 Sales Workers
Managers (wholesale and retail trade)
Sales supervisors and buyers
Technical salesmen, commercial travellers and manufacturers’ agents
Insurance, real estate, securities and business services salesmen and auctioneers
Salesmen, shop assistants and related workers
Sales workers not elsewhere classified
7 Service Workers
Managers (catering and lodging services)
Housekeeping and related service supervisors
Cooks, waiters, bartenders and relaters workers
Maids and related housekeeping
Service workers not elsewhere classified
Building caretakers, charworkers, cleaners and related workers
Launderers, dry-cleaners and pressers
Hairdressers, barbers, beauticians and related workers
Protective service workers
Service workers not elsewhere classified
8 Teachers Teachers
9 Medical Workers Medical, dental, veterinary and related workers
10 Manufacturing Workers
Production supervisors and general foremen
Miners, quarrymen, well drillers and related workers
Metal processers
Wood preparation workers and paper makers
Chemical processers and related workers
Spinners, weavers, knitters, dyers and related workers
Food and beverage processers
Tailors, dressmakers, sewers, upholsterers and related workers
Shoemakers and Leather Goods Makers; Cabinetmakers and Related Woodworkers
Stone Cutters and Carvers; Blacksmiths, Toolmakers and Machine-Tool Operators
Machinery Fitters, Machine Assemblers and Precision Instrument Makers (except Electrical)
Electrical Fitters and Related Electrical and Electronics Workers
Broadcasting Station and Sound Equipment Operators and Cinema Projectionists
Plumbers, Welders, Sheet Metal and Structural Metal Preparers and Erectors
Jewellry and Precious Metal Workers
Glass Formers, Potters and Related Workers
12 Constructors, Painters, Transportation
Printers and Related Workers; Painters
Production and Related Workers Not Elsewhere Classified
Bricklayers, Carpenters and Other Construction Workers
Stationary Engine and Related Equipment Operators
Material-Handling and Related Equipment Operators, Dockers and Freight Handlers
Transport Equipment Operators
Labourers Not Elsewhere Classified
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7 Additional Results
In this section we report results for a set of alternative regressions for the logit
model proposed in Section 2.4. The purpose is to assess the sensitivity of the
relationship between occupational mobility to the earnings shocks experienced.
Table A.2 report the results for both countries. The columns Add. Controls
show the coefficients when additional controls are added to the regression. Specif-
ically, age and its square. The columns Total Earnings show the coefficients when
the realization of the shocks, u−, are obtained from a regression with total earnings
instead of earnings per hour (i.e. the baseline case). The signs and magnitudes of
the coefficients confirms the similarity in the reaction of U.S. and German workers
to earnings shocks.
Table A.2: Logit Regression: United States vs. Germany
United States Germany
Total Earnings Add. Controls Total Earnings Add. Controls
u− −0.039 −0.032 −0.041 −0.022
(0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005)
Age −8.076× 10−3 −0.466× 10−3
(2.194× 10−3) (4.550× 10−3)
Age2 0.075× 10−3 −0.005× 10−3
(0.027× 10−3) (0.011× 10−3)
Note: The table displays the results of running a logit regression of the occupation switching decision
on the negative of the earnings residuals (u−1 = min{u, 0}) and on a set of additional controls (Add.
Controls) age, age squared, occupation dummies, and education dummies. For this second specifi-
cation the table displays only the coefficients of age and age squared. The first two columns show
results for the PSID and the last two columns show results for the SOEP.
8 Model Computation
Given a vector of parameters, the model’s solution involves two steps. Finding
occupation-decision policies and computing equilibrium wages
{
wj
}3
j=1 for the
three occupations.
• Occupation-decision policies: Despite the multi-armed bandit structure of
the worker’s problem, standard solutions31 for this type of problem can not
31This solution takes the form of what is known as a Gittins index. See Whittle (1982) for a
textbook exposition of scheduling problems.
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be applied in our framework. The reason is the presence of general human
capital introduces dependence across arms. In other words, the outcome in
a prospective occupation depends on the histories of shocks the worker re-
ceives in the current occupation.32 Instead, we obtain the occupation-decision
rules iterating directly on a worker’s value function. However, to solve the
problem of the worker, we do not directly use the equations described in the
text. It is convenient to re-scale all variables by dividing them by the (after-
tax) general level of human capital (ez+ej)1−φ1 . After that transformation the
optimal choice of an occupation can be rewritten as,
W˜s(Ωs, e, j) = max
{
V˜s(Ωs, e, j), {V˜s(Ωs, j′)}j′ 6=j
}
.
The value of staying - the analog to (15) is,
V˜s(Ωs, e, j) = e(1−γ)(1−φ1)e
{
u(c˜) + β
∫
W˜s+1(Ωs+1, e′, j)dFj(e)
}
, s.to
c˜ = φ0
(
wjeθj
)1−φ1
(27)
The value of an alternative occupation not previously tried can be rewritten
as:
V˜s
(
Ωs, j′
)
=
∫
V˜s
(
Ωs, θ, e, j′
)
dGj′(θ)dFj′(e). (28)
Conditional on a particular θ and e, the value of the alternative occupation is
that attained by adding the utility flow from earnings plus the continuation
value:
V˜s(Ωs, θj′ , e, j′) = e(1−γ)(1−φ1)e
{
u(c˜) + β
∫
W˜s+1(Ωs+1, e′, j′)dFj′ (e
′)
}
, s.to
(29)
c˜ = φ0
(
wj′e
θj′ e−c(s,κ)
)1−φ1
(30)
32The presence of age-dependent occupational moving costs is also an element that precludes
the use of a Gittins index.
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Finding the transformed value of an occupation involves eliminating the un-
certainty with respect to θ:
V˜s
(
Ωs, j′
)
=
∫
V˜s
(
Ωs, θ, e, j′
)
dFj′(e). (31)
To simplify the calculations we discretize the distributions of shocks
{
ej
}3
j=1
and occupation-specific abilities
{
θj
}3
j=1. Discretizing involves choosing the
number of points that constitute the support of e or θ and their probability
masses. Let Ne and Nθ be the number of points used to approximate the
distributions of e and θ. We use the same dimension for all occupations.
For j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the support of eˆj, the discretized ej, is
{
e1,j, . . . , eNe,j
}
. The
probability of sampling en,j is pn,j for n = 1, . . . , Ne. Likewise, for j ∈ {1, 2, 3},
the support of θˆj, the discretized θj, is
{
θ1,j, . . . , θNθ ,j
}
. The probability of
sampling θn,j is qn,j for n = 1, . . . , Nθ. Also, ∑
Ne
n=1 pn,j = 1 and ∑
Nθ
n=1 qn,j = 1
for any j. In the paper we set Ne = 6 and Nθ = 4.
With the discretization we compute value functions only at the set of points
that make up the support for e and θ. An expected value function is a
probability-weighted sum of value functions. For example, the discrete ap-
proximation to the left-hand-side of (31) is,
V˜s
(
Ωs, j′
) ≈ Ne∑
n=1
pn,jV˜s
(
Ωs, θ, en,j′ , j′
)
. (32)
Finally, the set Ωs for any give age s comprises two elements: (a) a vector{
χj
}
where χj = 1 if the occupation has been visited at any age up to (and
including) s− 1, (b) the vector of individual- and occupation-specific ability
values
{
θj
}3
j=1.
Starting with the guess W˜S+1 = 0 for any value of the state vector, we com-
pute all value functions for all ages and values of the state vector, by back-
ward induction.
• Equilibrium: To find the set of market-clearing wages we use the following
procedure:
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1. Guess a set of wages
{
w(m)j
}3
j=1
.
2. Calculate workers’ value functions according to the backward induction
procedure described earlier.
3. Simulate the lives of a large number P of agents.
4. Compute efficiency units of labor in each occupation j: Nj.
5. Compute a new set of wages
{
w(m+1)j
}3
j=1
.
The procedure stops when
∥∥∥∥{w(m)j }3j=1 − {w(m+1)j }3j=1
∥∥∥∥ ≈ 0.
With the results from Step 2, it is fairly simple to perform Step 3. Once the
value functions for workers have been computed, we can draw values for the
random variables and record workers’ occupational decisions and associated
productivity levels. With P agents33 each living for S years, let L be the total
number of individual-age observations: L = P× S = L1 + L2 + L3, where Lj
is the number of individual-age observations in occupation j. Then,
Nj =
1
Lj
Lj
∑
l=1
ezl eθj,l e−cl ,
where e−cl is equal to the switching cost for individual-age observation l, ezl
is her general human capital level, and eθj,l is her occupation-j ability.
33P = 240, 000 for all the results shown in the paper.
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